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Abstract 
The commentary sets out the candidate’s ideas for a new differentiated paradigm within the white collar crime 
subset of criminology for fraud auditing and the frauditor concept evolved from the candidate’s interest in 
combatting fraud against the public sector.  Over a public sector career auditing or training auditors from 1971 to 
2009 the candidate honed his thinking on the role of the internal auditor in relation to fraud, culminating in the 
publication in 2010 and 2012 of two books written by the candidate based around forensic internal auditing and the 
frauditor to counter fraud against organisations.  The candidate had realised during a five-year period in the mid-
1980s as a full-time lecturer at the Civil Service College teaching government internal auditors and then through his 
masters’ research in the early 1990s that internal auditors were not meeting expectations of management or the 
public on fraud. The candidate’s vision for a new type of internal auditor, the ‘frauditor’  developed through 
ethnography, unstructured interviews and documentary research  from his time in central government to the latter 
part of his public sector career while responsible for the internal audit service for Scotland Yard between 1996 and 
2009.      The candidate further referenced his concepts and philosophy through commentary and case studies in a 
book on public sector fraud and corruption published in 2015.   
The candidate recognised that he had a unique understanding gained from his experience and career of the 
relationship between the frauditor, the police and the civil and criminal justice systems in fighting internal and 
contractor fraud in public sector organisations.   The commentary also shows how the candidate used his 
understanding to develop a new and original fraud risk model and fraud wheel now promulgated across the public 
sector, as well as developing the concept of the frauditor in his published books. 
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Part 2 
2.1 Article submissions in date order 
 
2.2 Published Books by the Candidate 
 
How to be a Successful Frauditor (2010). Chichester, Wiley 
 
The Successful Frauditor’s Casebook (2012). Chichester, Wiley 
 
Fraud and Corruption in Public Services (2015). Farnham, Gower 
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 “Begin at the beginning,” the King said gravely, “and go on till you come to the end: then stop.”  
(Lewis Carroll, 1865) 
 
‘Begin with the end in mind’ 
(Russell J Allen, 1980), (Stephen R. Covey, 1989)  
 
Introduction  
This submission shows how books, articles and other material [listed in Annex 1] published by the candidate over a 
period of 17 years has led to the development of the concept of the fraud auditor (‘frauditor’) in the UK public 
sector.  It links the candidate’s own work to the field of criminology and its sub-discipline of ‘white collar crime’ 
(Sutherland, 1949), specifically fraud and corruption affecting organisations.  White collar crime is deviant criminal 
behaviour committed by persons in a position of trust in an organisation.  Fraud committed within a public sector 
organisation falls within the current definition of white collar crime.   The candidate’s work is placed in the context of 
current expectations of internal and external auditors in the public and private sector and then shows how the 
candidate has developed the concept of a forensic internal audit function and frauditor role within the context of 
public sector internal auditing.  The candidate has advocated the role of the frauditor and has set out a cogent 
methodology for a viable alternative to a criminal justice oriented approach to deal with internal and contractor 
fraud through his publications.  The candidate was solely responsible for setting up a separate forensic internal audit 
team within internal audit at the UK Metropolitan Police in 1996. The development and work of the team over the 
next decade and its benefits to the public purse were set out in Ridley (2008, Case Study 6.5).  
There has been little doctoral research into fraud and corruption in the public sector.  The candidate’s analysis from 
EthOS1 and of available literature showed that out of over half a million published theses only 290 mentioned fraud, 
of which just five related to the UK public sector.   A further 1,092 theses mentioned corruption but only two related 
to the UK public sector. The candidate identified 4,680 academic journal articles on fraud of which only 17 
referenced the UK public sector.  Fraud Risk within public entities is also an under-researched subset of Risk 
Management theory.  The candidate has developed a method and formula for evaluating fraud risk in the public 
sector and from it the concept of the fraud risk wheel that has developed and been used across the wider public 
sector.       
 
Core writings on fraud by the Candidate  
Since the Fraud Act 2006, fraud can be defined in the UK as ‘an offence resulting from dishonest behaviour that 
intentionally allows the fraudster or a third party to gain, or cause a loss to another. This can occur through false 
                                                          
1
 EthOS is the UK’s national thesis service maintained by the British Library.  It holds the records of all doctoral theses awarded 
by UK higher education since 1800. 
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representation, failure to disclose information or abuse of position.’ (Tickner, 2010, p.5).  Fraud against the state is 
‘Any action by individuals or organisations intended to cause a loss to the taxpayer or misuse of state provided funds 
through false representation, deliberate omission or suppression of information.’ (Tickner, 2015, p5.).  All 
organisations are vulnerable to internal criminality (Shepherd, 2016).  The candidate’s experiences of public sector 
fraud, as an external auditor in the NHS in the early 1970s through to teaching systems audit at the Civil Service 
College in the early 1980s, then as head of internal audit at HM Treasury through to being Director of Internal Audit 
at the Metropolitan Police from 1995 to 2009, created a realisation that the auditing profession had moved away 
from its core role  in fraud prevention and detection and that many auditors were ill-equipped to understand or 
tackle fraud in the public sector.  It was this realisation that was the driving force behind writing ‘How to be a 
Successful Frauditor’ (Tickner, 2010).  
 ‘Where does this book stand in the ever more crowded field of UK studies of fraud? Right up there with Mike 
Comer’s Corporate Fraud, which Tickner describes as ‘seminal’. ....you will lean to Comer’s or Tickner’s books 
as go-to guides for fraud investigation, and simply a good read about workplaces and human nature.’  (Mark 
Rowe, Professional Security magazine review, 2012)  
‘All the current talk of auditors’ responsibilities around fraud detection seems, well, so old hat having read 
Peter’s books – notably ‘How to be a Successful Frauditor’ – and articles across the years. As an editor of 
titles in the financial crime space (Fraud Intelligence [www.counter-fraud.com] and Money Laundering 
Bulletin [www.moneylaunderingbulletin.com]), I know our readers, all either professionals or academics, 
have learnt much from his writing, as I undoubtedly have.’  (Timon Molloy, Informa, 2019) 
The candidate continued the frauditor theme in the isomorphic learning set out in the follow-up book ‘The 
Successful Frauditor’s Casebook’ (Tickner, 2012).    
 
Fraud and the development of fraud awareness in the public sector 
The last twenty years have seen the emergence of trained counter fraud specialists in the public sector, mainly in the 
NHS, DWP and local authorities (Button et al, 2007a).  Despite this development, research has shown that there is 
still some distance to go before there can be said to be a counter fraud profession in the UK public sector (Frimpong, 
2013).   The Cabinet Office launched a proposed counter fraud profession in 2018, with the intention of creating a 
government standard for counter fraud work.   Counter-fraud work in the public sector is the logical extension of the 
original concept behind public sector audit (Tickner, 2015, p.269). 
 Anti-fraud activity within the UK public sector can be traced back to William the Conqueror’s appointment of 
sheriffs required to ‘accompt’2 annually and the Exchequer court’s role in keeping and checking the tallies and rolls 
that were created to prevent fraud and ensure receipt of taxes due to the King (Madox, 1711 pp709-10).  Auditors of 
the King’s income and expenditure, initially ad-hoc members of the barony and senior clergy were from the time of 
Edward II permanent officials of the Court of the Exchequer (Madox, 1711, pp 729-30).   By the early 18th century 
                                                          
2
 The earliest known accountant role in the UK  
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there were separate auditors at court of revenue and expenditure and in 1785 George III set up the Commissioners 
for auditing the Public Accounts.  
The growth of a civil service based on merit not patronage following the Northcote-Trevelyan report (1854) 
coincided with concerns that the levers of state to prevent fraud and mismanagement were no longer fit for 
purpose. Gladstone commissioned a review of the origins and history of the Exchequer (1864) during his second 
term as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1859-66).  This led to fundamental reform of the accountability of public 
servants culminating in the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866, abolishing the Commissioners for auditing the Public 
Accounts and the Comptroller of the Exchequer and giving their powers to the Comptroller and Auditor General to 
ensure independent scrutiny of public accounts before they were presented to parliament.   
In parallel in the private sector the need for an external audit to protect stakeholders, first recognised by Parliament 
in 1721 with the appointment of an independent auditor following the scandals arising from the South Sea ‘Bubble’ 
share price collapse in 1720, there had been a steady growth of a  professionalised external audit of companies in 
the 19th century.  Scandals and frauds still arose but the landmark Kingston Cotton Mill appeal judgement (1896) was 
the start of the slide towards an expectation gap between the role of the external auditor and the public around the 
detection and prevention of fraud.  In the judgement Lord Justice Lopes noted ‘An auditor is not bound to be a 
detective, or, as was said, to approach his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is something 
wrong. He is a watch-dog, but not a bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried servants of the company in whom 
confidence is placed by the company.’’   To this day that sentiment has been echoed by leaders of major external 
auditing companies, as in the evidence given to the Business Energy and Industry Strategy select committee in 2019 
by the Chief Executive of Grant Thornton, the fifth largest UK auditing company, when he noted that there was an 
expectation gap on public perception and it was not the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud (oral evidence 
30/1/2019). It is a view that is increasingly being challenged, not least by the select committee in its report (April 
2019).  Carmichael (2018, p48) states: ‘It is indisputable that an auditor of financial statements has a fraud detection 
responsibility.’ 
The candidate’s own experiences as an auditor in the NHS between 1971 and 1978 developed his awareness of the 
likelihood of fraud in public sector organisations (Tickner, 2010, preface, pp10-12, 22-23, 36, 76-78). The growth in 
public services and the privatisation agenda pursued in the 1980s with the blurring of the line between the public 
good and private profitability created increased opportunities for fraud and corruption by contractors and staff 
employed in the public sector.   Fraud prevention and detection in public services has become more complex than 
anything envisaged either in the days of tallies or arising from Gladstone’s reforms in the 1860s.  The UK government 
has at various times set up and then abolished bodies intended to tackle the issue of fraud against the public sector 
(Tickner, 2015, p.99).   
For centuries the activities of an auditor have been the only independent means for larger organisations to try to 
prevent and detect fraud.   At first this was done laboriously by comprehensive checking of transactions and financial 
records, a ‘vouching and verification’ audit little different from the practices of medieval auditors in the Exchequer 
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that persisted until the 1960s and early 1970s.     In the post Thatcherism world of New Public Management in the 
UK such an intensive level of audit scrutiny in the public sector cannot be justified for the levels of risk and financial 
loss it might prevent or detect.  
 
Emergence of Systems Auditing and the development of New Public Management 
In the mid to late 1970s and through into the 1980s audit methodologies grew and developed around the concept of 
systems auditing and identifying the internal control system.  While initially centred round financial controls, the role 
for internal auditors developed to embrace a review of all the internal controls within an organisation to achieve its 
objectives.   The idea of a more participative and management oriented function for internal audit developed in 
parallel (e.g. Mints, 1972) with the dichotomy between the policeman and advisor role of the internal auditor in the 
public sector highlighted by Morgan and Pattinson in 1975.   In the 1980s and 1990s the concept of audit spread 
pervasively through all aspects of activity, from the decisions of clinicians in the NHS to commercial operations in oil 
companies, so much so that leading accounting  academics such as Michael Power (1994) felt obliged to point out 
the consequences and risks of the ‘audit explosion’.  The wider spread of the concept of audit in the public sector 
can be directly linked to the growth of ‘New Public Management’ in the 1980s onward.  E.g. Hoyle (2011, abstract 
and pp275-279) in the NHS context ‘Managers are seen to concentrate on issues of targets, audits and budgets with 
little thought given to the impact these decisions will have on patient care or nurses’ working conditions.’ 
While New Public Management fundamentally changed the nature and accountability of public services in the UK by 
devolvement of central government functions, the Public Finance Initiative, growth of quangos and semi-
autonomous bodies, blurring of the boundaries between the public and private sector with outsourcing and 
insourcing, as well as the direct role of the private sector in delivery of some public services,  culminating in a new 
public accountability through resource accounting  and the concept of ‘whole of government accounts’ (Likierman, 
1998), questions have arisen about the perceived notion that the private sector ‘knew best’, overly complex 
management accounting and the growth of financial efficiency rather than effectiveness as the measurement of 
public sector achievement under neoliberalism and New Public Management (Groot and Budding, 2008, Mauro et al, 
2019).  The emphasis on value for money, financial efficiency and cost conscious budgeting of public services can be 
seen as beneficial to both the taxpayer and  the professional disciplines of accounting and auditing but in practice 
the end result is a new type of totalitarianism (Lorenz, 2012, p608) in which cost and value for money rule a risk-
based agenda that is really only about efficiency and the auditing function is overly obsessed with measurement and 
risk to the exclusion of ethical and moral values of rightness and the public good. The emphasis on risk management, 
systems and organisational objectives has deflected internal auditing away from the basics of financial control and 
preventing fraud (Tickner, 2015, p271).  
‘The fact that there is not a shred of evidence for these two crucial assumptions of NPM [whether managers 
spend tax-payers money more efficiently or wisely than professionals] —rather the opposite—makes 
abundantly clear where the blind spots lie in NPM. That all the recent economic scandals— from Enron, 
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WorldCom, and Barings to the Lehman Brothers—happened despite constant audits furnishes some extra 
empirical food for critical thought on both management and audits.’ (Lorenz, 2012, pp 609-610).   
Cost-cutting in the public sector has had an adverse effect on counter-fraud activity (Tickner, 2015, pp 276-277).    
Within the public sector, the discipline of internal auditing became aligned from 1980 through to the present day 
with the standards for internal auditing in the private sector by the adoption by HM Treasury of the Institute of 
Internal Auditors standards for internal auditing through the publication of the Government Internal Audit Manual 
(1988) and subsequent guidance.  Academic writing has reinforced the passive preventative role of internal auditing 
in the standards at the expense of its value as a detective and investigative tool (e.g. Smith et al, 2011, pp80-113).  
 
Refocusing government internal auditors to be ‘frauditors’. 
It is the candidate’s contention that internal audit in government can be refocused as a control in itself with a 
proactive role as a preventer, detector and investigator of fraud and corruption in public service.  To that end the 
candidate has developed through ‘How to be a Successful Frauditor (2010), ‘The Successful Frauditor’s Case Book 
(2012) and ‘Fraud and Corruption in Public Services (2015) a route map for public sector auditors and those in public 
sector management to become refocused on the core values and responsibilities of auditing in government around 
the prevention and detection of fraud, error and waste.  The refocusing includes setting out the principles of fraud 
investigation, highlighting the use of isomorphic learning for the public sector, the use of risk management and risk 
models for determining counter-fraud activity and the role of the frauditor in the prevention of fraud.   The 
candidate’s visualisation of a frauditor shows parallels with the concept of the polibation officer envisaged by Nash 
(1999, p361).  
 
Reflections on and Discussion of  Research Methodology 
Enrolling on this PhD and reading books on research methods has led the candidate to realise that he used many of 
the tools of social science researchers in developing the frauditor concept and researching the books submitted in 
part fulfilment of the PhD.  While it is acknowledged that the books were written from the viewpoint of a 
professional practitioner and not intended to form a body of work for a doctoral submission, nevertheless  the wide 
range of techniques and methods, which were used within an appropriate ethical framework (as set out below), 
equate to a traditional doctorate.3    
                                                          
3
 These include: ethnographic studies, reactive and non-reactive observation (Scott, 1991, pp2-3)(e.g. ‘The frauditor 
finally starts work on the case’ (Tickner, 2012 p57 para 3), unstructured and semi-structured interviews (Bell, 1993, 
162-165) narrative enquiry (Bell, 1993, pp18-22) (e.g. the police officer who investigated Joyti De Laurey (Tickner, 
2012, pp67-78)) and case studies (Bell, 1993, pp8-10 and Bassey, 1999, p12) with victims of fraud, fraud investigators 
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The tools and approaches used by the candidate parallel legitimate research methods and on reflection from an 
academic standpoint can be best described as a mixed methods approach, with elements that range from Grounded 
Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) through Action Research (e.g. Brannick and Coughlan, 2007, pp65-68) to elements 
that fall clearly within interpretivist thinking and constructivism.  Qualitative measurement has been a key aspect of 
developing the frauditor concept. Consequently the candidate’s research reflected in his writings can be broadly 
aligned to interpretivist and constructivist social science theory while seen more specifically within the discipline of 
criminology and the sub discipline of white collar crime.     
Ethical issues 
The candidate is aware of the need to ensure that any research is both ethical and meets the expected standards for 
academe at the relevant point in time.  At the time the candidate was researching and writing his first two books 
universities relied largely on the relationship between supervisor and student to determine the appropriate ethical 
steps.  The UK Research Integrity Office issued its first public guidance on research ethics for academics in 
September 2009, when the candidate had already carried out the research that featured in the first book.  
The candidate wrote the publications submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the award of a PhD while 
a practitioner and they have not therefore been submitted to any academic body for ethical consideration.  
However, because of his professional background the candidate has been bound by the Code of Ethics of the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) since 1980.  The IIA Code includes the need for independence and objectivity in the 
candidate’s work as well as confidentiality in handling organisational information and data.  It echoes many of the 
ethical expectations of universities at the time the publications were researched and written.  Throughout and since 
his public service career the candidate has also been and remains bound by the Official Secrets Act.  
Before writing the submitted books the candidate negotiated with the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and his 
then employer the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) for the candidate’s access to information gleaned during his 
work at the MPS for the purposes of research and writing.  This included ensuring that the Candidate would not 
publish any material related to matters gleaned though his work at the Metropolitan Police without first submitting 
relevant parts of the manuscript for approval by his former employers. The candidate complied with this 
requirement before publication.   This also included confidentiality where necessary for those involved in the 
matters covered within the publications.     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
(e.g. the ‘Nun on the Run’ auditors (Tickner, 2012, pp39-49), and fraudsters (e.g. Tickner, 2012, pp235-251) the 
journalist who exposed the Firepower scandal (Tickner 2012, pp267-275) and documentary research (e.g. ‘ZZZZ Best 
and Barrie Minkow, (Tickner, 2012, pp253-264)). The candidate used his unique access to relevant official closed or 
restricted documents as well as informal interviews of police and police staff investigators for case studies at the 
MPS (e.g. ‘Laird of Tomintoul ‘ Tickner (2012) pp93-105 and ‘Corporate Credit Cards for Cops’ (Tickner 2010, pp126-
131, 2012, pp107-126).   
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Basis for Research Methods Used  
There is a sound basis for the research methods used by the candidate in considering the rational and logical 
application of knowledge gained in a way that can best be described as part grounded theory and part action 
research as well as the reliance on informal ethnographical research over a lengthy period of time in two major 
organisations – a cultural and social anthropological experience unique to the candidate.   Throughout his career at 
the MPS and the MPA between 1995 and 2009 the candidate kept daily notebook diaries of his activities and key 
events and decisions taken during the working day.  This unique record has aided the candidate in retrospectively 
placing his body of work within the discipline of social science research.  The diaries of daily occurrences in the 
candidate’s working life ran to forty volumes and enabled the candidate to place his work in context when 
researching his first book.  
“Veritatem inquirenti, semel in vita de omnibus, quantum fieri potest, esse dubitandum.”  
[If you would be a real seeker after truth, it is necessary that at least once in your life you doubt, as far as possible, 
all things]  (Rene Descartes, 1644) 
 
The candidate has recognised the value of self-doubt in keeping an open mind and making careful factual analysis 
during fraud investigations (Tickner, 2010, pp76-78). The candidate’s natural inclination has been a sceptical 
Pyrrhonian view of stated ‘facts’ and  looking for rational explanation though a mixture of inductive and deductive 
approaches when investigating potential fraudulent activity, applying the knowledge gained through his professional 
qualification and practical field experience (Tickner, 2010, p20).  This aspect of the candidate’s work is closely aligned 
with Grounded Theory as first espoused by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in the researching of factual data to support 
qualitative judgements.  It fits well with the expected attributes of a social scientist, e.g. ‘a scientific attitude being 
systematic, sceptical and ethical’. (Robson, 2011).   
An ability to recognise data that does not fit, whether unexpected body language, numbers in accounting documents 
that do not seem ‘right’ or explanations given in structured interviews that do not fit the known facts has enabled 
the candidate to specialise successfully in fraud detection and investigation through an ability to apply prior learning 
in examining data for a potential fraud as well as an ability to spot potential links between unrelated data and the 
persistence to research until the anomaly is explained or a fraud discovered.   
 
 
Ethnographical research in the workplace 
The first period of unstructured ethnographical research was during the candidate’s years as a NHS field auditor 
between 1971 and 1978. NHS field auditors were expected to travel from hospital to hospital, borrowing spare 
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accommodation to conduct their work at each location.  The candidate developed an aptitude for blending in at 
hospitals and relying on unobtrusively observing workplace behaviour to test out the validity of financial records 
checked for fraud, waste and abuse.  The nature of the work and the frauds and scandals that were uncovered gave 
grounding both in human nature and understanding how frauds and abuses occurred, from ancillary workers abusing 
overtime or stealing assets through to consultants and professionals abusing their position to defraud the NHS, as 
well as seeing how staff and contractors tried to take advantage of trusting NHS management.  It was during this 
period that the candidate was able to reinforce a challenging and sceptical view of the weaknesses in financial 
systems and potential for individuals to gain at others expense at work and also learnt most from his own mistakes 
and shortcomings in early fraud investigations  (Tickner, 2012, pp15-23).  
The second period of unstructured ethnographical research was at the Metropolitan Police, where the candidate 
was Director of Internal Audit between 1995 and 2009.  In early 1996 the candidate found evidence of fraud and 
corruption in the works department, the subsequent investigation led by the candidate uncovered an armed robber 
with a police contract, including maintenance work at Robbery Squad HQ (Tickner, 2010, pp221-223).  The internal 
battles that followed to convince management to deal with the consequences gave the candidate an early 
realisation that police officers and non-police staff operated in fundamentally separate worlds although members of  
the same organisation.  As has been evinced in ethnographies by such respected names as Hobbs (1988) unless 
perceived as part of the police culture, generally police officers do not share their real thoughts about any matters 
with ‘civvies’4.   Following a ‘lucky’ decision when the candidate recruited a retired Fraud Squad Detective 
Superintendent to assist with internal fraud investigations, the candidate learnt that police officers were likely to 
support their colleagues, however mistakenly, rather than deal with issues raised by non-police staff.   The candidate 
then set about immersing himself in the police culture as far as possible.  He became an objective bystander looking 
in at the operational world of both uniform and plain clothes police officers and gained insights at every level.  By the 
nature of his role following a major fraud prior to his appointment the candidate was a party to meetings with senior 
police officers and became a member of the police Anti-Corruption Board set up in 1996.  At a working level the 
candidate took every opportunity to make contact with managers and officers running local units.  By now the 
candidate had recruited further retired detectives who in turn became part of the fraud investigation team 
organised by the candidate and as trust developed they shared ‘war stories’ and introduced the candidate to those 
they trusted on the operational side of policing.   There then followed a series of high profile internal investigations 
into fraud and potential corruption involving contractors or staff of the MPS when the candidate worked alongside 
operational police officers and developed a rapport with those that shared similar ethical values. By the time the 
candidate took early retirement in 2009 he had built up his own internal network of police contacts who would act 
as his eyes and ears in the MPS.  Ethnography to aid fraud investigation has continued to be used by the candidate 
since 2009, e.g. Tickner, 2012, p57. 
                                                          
4
 It is a common misconception, widely held in the police as well, that police officers are not civilians.   
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Figure 1 - Breakdown of Research Methods used in the Candidate’s Books  
 
Figure 2 – Ethnography Methods                              Figure 3 - Document Research Methods  
 
            
 
 
 
Emergence of an expectation gap between the public and the audit community 
The Candidate’s early research around audit expectations published in 1995 identified inter alia an expectation gap 
around the role of the auditor in relation to fraud between top management and chief internal auditors in central 
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government and government agencies.  The gap has been highlighted as an issue that needs to be addressed by the 
CEO of the global Institute of Internal Auditors who noted in 2014:  
 
‘Peter Tickner, a U.K. consultant on corporate governance and fraud issues, cites differences of opinion over 
who is responsible for fraud deterrence and for setting and assessing ethical culture. Tickner's quote: "Top 
management was convinced that one of the key roles of the chief audit executive was to deal proactively with 
the risks around fraud and corruption, whereas generally the CAEs saw it as senior management's problem 
and responsibility." Unfortunately, our stakeholders sometimes want more assurance than we may be able to 
provide.’  (Chambers, 2014).  
The public sector ‘internal’ auditor’s role was historically that of a check to prevent fraud or loss to the exchequer 
(Madox 1711, pp729-30).     Auditing as a separate professional discipline emerged as late as the 1960s, reflected in 
the five key principles of auditing identified by Mautz and Sharaf (1961).   As noted by Grodz, Mautz and Sharaf 
postulated that that an effective internal control system would eliminate the probability (although not the 
possibility) of fraud and therefore the auditor had a key role in testing the effectiveness of the system of internal 
control.  However they also argued that if an auditor had found a system to be sound in the past they might 
reasonably conclude in the absence of any evidence to the contrary that it would continue to be sound in the future.  
That in itself limits an auditor’s responsibilities (Grodz, 2016, pp98-99).  As the auditing profession became more 
organised and state and commercial business more complex the roles of auditors became increasingly prescribed, 
with professional auditing bodies increasingly seeking to absolve their members from any specific responsibility for 
detecting or investigating fraud as part of the audit function.   This is reflected in the current published auditing 
standards for external auditors, International Auditing Standard 240 (UK, 2016), which states that external auditors 
will rarely find fraud and that only fraud that is material to the financial statements is relevant.  To be ‘material’ a 
fraud would have to be large enough that the financial statements could not be said to represent a true and fair view 
of the organisation’s business.   Disclaimers are commonplace in external audit reports on financial statements to 
absolve responsibility if any fraud is not detected or considered material enough to report to stakeholders.   This sits 
at odds both with internal top management expectations and that of the general public.  Similarly international 
standards for the professional practice of internal auditing state that: ‘Internal auditors must have sufficient 
knowledge to evaluate the risk of fraud and the manner in which it is managed by the organization, but are not 
expected to have the expertise of a person whose primary responsibility is detecting and investigating fraud.’ 
(Standard 1210.A2, 2016).  
 
Whenever any major fraud or corruption scandal comes to light, either when a large commercial organisation is 
brought to its knees or a public sector organisation faces major organisational change or abolition because of fraud 
there is almost always a backlash blaming the auditors for failing to uncover the fraud.  (E.g. In 1994 the 
Metropolitan Police discovered a senior member of the civil staff had defrauded the police of £5million.  In the 
subsequent internal enquiries police officers were cleared of any blame but the internal audit head and several 
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internal auditors left, even though the subsequent Hyde5report showed that the internal auditors had been blocked 
from reviewing the area where the fraud was discovered by their line management - and despite this were planning 
to audit where the fraud was committed when unfortunately for them it came to light before the audit commenced 
(Tickner, 2012, pp94-105).  At the PAC hearing in June 1995 one of the questions asked by MPs of the then head of 
the Met’s civil staff was ‘Why haven’t you fired the auditors yet?’ (Malan, 1995, p70). The uncomfortable truth is 
that while the responsibility for preventing and uncovering fraud lies primarily with management and any oversight 
Board, auditors are expected to have a far more proactive role to play on behalf of management and the board, but 
the auditing profession has developed defence mechanisms to absolve itself of responsibility.  Internal audit could 
and should be a primary weapon for organisational management in preventing and detecting fraud (Tickner, 2010, 
preface x, p304).   
 
 
Redressing the balance with the fraud auditor 
 
The candidate’s premise is that the auditing profession, both internal and external has taken a wrong turn over the 
last 100 years or so when properly equipped and experienced internal auditors are in fact best placed to prevent and 
detect so-called ‘white collar crime’, a phrase first coined by the criminologist Edwin Sutherland (1949)6, and should 
be the first port of call to protect organisations.    Through the 2010 book ‘How to Be a Successful Frauditor’ the 
candidate redressed the balance in showing the auditing profession that there is a role for the fraud auditor, i.e. 
frauditor (a term first used in print by Lekan (2003) in the context of bank collapses through fraud undetected by 
external audit, although the candidate had developed a separate frauditor concept from 1996 onwards in the 
creation of a forensic audit team within internal audit).   While Lekan’s short article encapsulates a number of the 
attributes of a potential frauditor, it is more about the attributes of an overly suspicious person even when there is 
no grounds for the suspicion, rather than a serious attempt to define frauditing, suggesting at one point that the 
frauditor should study criminology as well as adopting the methods of the shabby eponymous homicide TV detective 
in Columbo.    The role envisaged by the candidate does not have to be confrontational to meet the objective of 
being a successful frauditor, as the role is primarily an extension of the existing role of the internal auditor in the 
public sector.   
  
                                                          
5
 Wilfred Hyde, a senior Home Office official, supported by Metropolitan Police internal auditors, conducted an urgent review of 
the controls over Metropolitan Police covert operations in the wake of the Williams fraud. 
6
Sutherland’s original definition excluded managers and employees of organisations, the very people identified with the term 
today. 
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Figure 4 
Development of Role of Internal and External Audit from Edward II to the Present Day 
Audit 
Purpose 
 14th to 17th 
Century 
18th to 20th 
Century 
1940s to 1990s 2000 to present 
Internal Audit  Fraud and error 
checking only 
Financial control 
auditing for chief 
financial officer 
Systems-based 
audit assurance 
to top 
management  
Holistic audit risk 
assurance to 
those 
responsible for 
governance 
External Audit   Did not exist Financial 
watchdog 
for stakeholders 
Financial health 
and controls for 
CEO/Board 
Risk-based 
financial audit 
for those 
responsible for 
governance 
Audit 
Process 
 14
th to 17th 
Century 
18th to 20th 
Century 
1940s to 1990s 2000 to present 
Internal Audit  Formal interview 
document 
examination 
Vouching and 
verification of 
accounts 
Measuring 
effectiveness  of 
system controls 
Evaluating risks 
and control 
effectiveness 
External Audit  Did not exist Checking 
financial records 
for fraud/error 
Testing truth and 
fairness of 
accounts 
As per 1990s plus 
key financial  risk 
assessment 
 
Development of the frauditor concept for the internal auditor by the candidate 
Development of the frauditor concept grew as the candidate immersed himself in the culture of a police organisation 
over a period of nearly fourteen years between 1995 and 2009. Out of this grew an increasing awareness that the 
managerial world and auditors in the public sector had simply ‘got it wrong’ in developing the role of auditors (see 
figure 4) and understanding the nature of fraud prevention, detection and investigation, especially the expectations 
of and by auditors and the police and the criminal justice system (Tickner, 2010, pp45-48). It is not dissimilar to 
Hobbs’ recognition after returning to his neighbourhood roots that he could turn his East End cultural background 
and informal contacts with detectives and villains to advantage in his planned research (Hobbs, 1988, pp5-16). 
The roots of academic research are the deductive reasoning of Plato and the inductive methods of Aristotle 
(Walliman, 2011, pp17-20). Ideally the candidate’s publications might have systematically developed from planned 
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research and its results.  Although this is not the case the candidate’s   publications demonstrate rigor and learning 
that has led to the ability to be able to recognise and add to knowledge.  In ethnographical and anthropological 
research a key element is the state of mind of the researcher and their ability to draw out the learning and 
knowledge without unduly influencing or being influenced by those being studied.  The approach of the candidate is 
not dissimilar to Hobbs (1988, p2) in studying the culture of the police. On occasion social science studies have not 
been feasible by normal research methodologies with organised structured or semi-structured interviews and 
contemporaneous note-taking to support evidence gathering and yet the results of such research are also acceptable 
in the scientific community (Sutherland, 1937, Ditton 1977, pp9-13, Button 2006, p26) .This is much the case in two 
long periods of the candidate’s work experiences that culminated in the decision to write ‘How to Be a Successful 
Frauditor’ (2010) and ‘The Successful Frauditor’s Casebook’ (2012) where  Sutherland’s approach (1937) is mirrored 
in chapter 17, drafted by the author before being checked and edited by the convicted fraudster.   
 
Public Sector Internal Auditing and the need for the ‘Frauditor’ as envisioned by the candidate 
The emergence of the role of the fraud-oriented auditor in the public sector suffered a set-back from the late 19th 
century through to the present day.  The candidate’s work in this field has sought to redress the balance and move 
the public sector internal auditor to the forefront of the fight against fraud and corruption in public services, 
involving a shift in emphasis from the perceived role under New Public Management represented by a rise in the 
idea of an internal audit function as an adjunct to management performance improvement and accountability 
through improving control process systems. ‘The internal audit activity must evaluate and contribute to the 
improvement of the organisations governance, risk management and control processes using a systematic, 
disciplined and risk based approach.’7   Power (1994) has rightly challenged whether a slavish approach to system 
and process review in itself becomes a meaningless process.   
Internal Auditing in the UK public sector was put on a professional footing following a critical NAO review and report 
in 1979 and subsequent PAC8 hearing.    A further review by the NAO (1987, p17) noted inter alia that ‘Internal 
Auditors should endeavour to reveal any serious defects in systems of internal control which might lead to the 
perpetration of fraud, irregularity or malpractice’.  The last published guidance (HM Treasury, 2012) on fraud and 
internal audit repeated government internal audit standards (GIAS) and made it plain that while an internal auditor 
may take on a risk management role around fraud and be asked to investigate fraud by management it is not part of 
the core role of the internal auditor, even though the internal auditor is expected to consider the risk of fraud and 
the potential for fraud and corruption discovery in every audit assignment.  
The change from vouching and verification to systems auditing was primarily to give a more effective and efficient 
audit at less cost. But as Power (1994) has noted ‘even with strong guarantees of independence, systems based 
                                                          
7
 Standard 2100 of the global Institute of Internal Auditors adopted by the Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors (UK and 
Ireland) 
8
 Committee of Public Accounts 1980-1 session 
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audits can easily become a kind of ritual, concerned with process rather than substance’.   In more recent times 
systems-based auditing has evolved into the concept of ‘risk-based assurance auditing’.  Despite this apparent 
guarantee that auditing is covering the risks including fraud and giving assurance to management, the need for a 
frauditor as envisaged by the candidate can arise from several scenarios.  (1) A systems/assurance audit may identify 
a weakness in internal control that could lead to fraud.  In a Utopian world no fraud has happened and the system 
weakness highlighted by the auditor is put right.  In the real world management may have no idea if the weakness 
has been fraudulently exploited.   Here the frauditor has a role to play in reviewing both the past to ensure no 
significant fraud has occurred and in ensuring that if there are delays in putting in preventative measures line 
management are alerted to the risk of fraud.  Unrectified highlighted weaknesses can trigger fraudulent activity 
(Tickner, 2010, pp37-40, 250-252).  (2) A fraud is uncovered by a work colleague or line manager of the fraudster and 
management needs someone to investigate and establish the facts.  In organisations that do not have a separate 
anti-fraud capability it may fall to the chief internal auditor or another senior manager to investigate in the first 
instance.   Here the skills of the frauditor come to the fore.  (3)   An external or anonymous whistle-blower may raise 
a concern that the frauditor may be best placed to investigate.   The frauditor will have the necessary tools and 
knowledge to establish the facts of an allegation or accusation of fraud.   
Statistically tip-offs are the most common reason for business fraud discovery (40%), with internal audit in second 
place (15%), management a close third (13%) and external audit (4%) hardly at the races (ACFE, 2018). In the UK 
there has been a growth in the detection of fraud by the use of automated analytical techniques and this is now a 
close third behind internal audit in second place (PWC UK report 2019).  UK Public Sector  fraud reviews have not 
published the reasons for discovery in a way that enables a direct comparison with these surveys, particularly since 
2002 (DAO (Gen) 15/02)9  when departments reporting for the annual Fraud Return were asked to assign means of 
discovery to broad categories that did not identify auditors or tip-offs clearly from other categories.  Such UK 
government surveys were also inherently inaccurate, many government departments and related bodies either 
completed nil or incomplete annual returns.   Analysis of the data provided reveals anomalies.10 
 
Recognising the need for the Frauditor 
The need for the fraud auditor has been recognised in recent years by those who specialise in fraud auditing and 
fraud investigation.   Singleton and Singleton (2010, pp12-13) define fraud auditing as a subset of forensic accounting 
but then go on to state that ‘fraud auditing involves a specialised approach and methodology to discern fraud’ 
whereas forensic accountants are called in once a fraud has been discovered.  It is understandable that as qualified 
accountants Singleton and Singleton see fraud auditing as part and parcel of a forensic accountants role but  the 
                                                          
9
 Dear Accounting Officer letter from HM Treasury instructing departments on the nature and content of annual fraud returns. 
These were discontinued in 2008 when the responsibility transferred to the short-lived NFA and then the Cabinet Office. 
10
 For instance returns for the years 1993 to 1996 show absence of control and failure to operate controls averaging between 
67% and 71% of cases but the means of discovery is put down to the ‘normal operation of controls’ in between 40-50% of cases. 
In that period around a third of government departments gave a ‘nil return’ on discovered fraud.  
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skills necessary to be a fraud auditor are neither exclusive to qualified accountants nor would many practising 
accountants have the skills to be a fraud auditor.   Vona (2011, preface) noted that he would like professional studies 
to indicate that auditing is the number one reason for fraud detecting.  While there is merit in his Awareness Theory 
Methodology for fraud auditing (Vona, 2011, p2) it is based on a premise not borne out by research.    Surveys such 
as ACFE’s Report to the Nations (2018) and the Global Economic Crime Survey (PWC, 2018) have repeatedly shown 
that external audit is only responsible for a small fraction of all fraud detections.   The successful frauditor is not just 
an individual with the knowledge and skills to combine audit work with fraud investigation, it is a mindset that 
enables potential internal fraud to be discovered and an approach that can be carried out as a separate function 
within an organisation.  The candidate’s own journey from auditor to frauditor was in itself a learning experience 
throughout a working career spanning four decades and forms the basis of the principles and practices set out in 
‘How to be a Successful Frauditor (Tickner, 2010). 
The recent creation of a counter fraud profession within the UK public sector reflects the growing dissatisfaction 
among taxpayers that internal and external auditors are unable or unwilling to tackle the detection or investigation 
of internal and contractor fraud.   There is within the UK public sector a long tradition of fraud investigation within 
organisations that deal directly with the public, such as HM Revenue and Customs and the functions that now fall to 
the Department of Work and Pensions. Here fraud investigation is performed by specialist counter-fraud officers 
against a legal framework where they have policing and other statutory powers to enable them to fulfil a criminal 
justice role.   This role is separate from that envisaged by the candidate.   The role of a frauditor is not to act as a 
pseudo-policeman as part of the criminal justice system, but to prevent, detect and investigate potentially significant 
fraud to ensure taxpayers’ money is used where intended and revenues due to the state are adequately protected 
against the risk of fraud.  It is the fundamental importance of this distinction that forms a central tenet to the 
differentiated approach envisaged in the concept of the frauditor. 
 
Conceptual differences between a frauditor’s investigation and one driven by the criminal justice system 
A conceptual differentiation between the candidate’s principles for fraud investigation and those whose background 
or training is based around the requirements of criminal law enforcement is the candidate’s focus on the 
fundamentals of objective fact-gathering and dealing effectively with fraud affecting the organisation.  The 
candidate’s unique experience of dealing successfully with internal and contractor fraud from within the UK’s largest 
police force over a period of fourteen years developed an insight into the differences between the nature of a police 
investigation into a fraud and the nature of an affected organisation’s investigation into a fraud.   It was this insight 
from working within a police environment that enabled the candidate to see clearly that approaches and attempts 
by public sector organisations to mimic police processes may serve the needs of the criminal justice system but not 
necessarily the best interests of the organisation affected by the fraud.  Blind adoption of policing methodology 
based around the criminal law can have unintended and unhelpful consequences in the public sector, creating overly 
complex investigations and unnecessary cost to the tax-payer.   Lane found that local authority teams, and others 
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who are not suspect oriented, may better fit the ideal that the purpose of an investigation is to discover the truth 
rather than construct a case against a known offender, a criticism which has previously been levelled at the police 
(Sanders and Young, 2003). Lane noted this has a bearing on how evidence is gathered and consequently, best 
practice within policing investigations may not be the appropriate benchmark for local authorities (Lane, 2011, 
p201).   Introducing the police National Intelligence Model into DWP, the Identity and Passport Service and the 
Driving Standards Agency bureaucratised processes, alienated staff and gave no discernible benefit, ultimately 
proving more of a problem than a solution (Osborn, 2012).  The candidate had recognised these weaknesses in those 
public sector organisations adopting a purely policing approach to tackling fraud and corruption and hence certain 
core principles can be derived from the candidate’s approach that enables the public sector fraud investigator to 
maximise the impact and benefit of applying the principles envisaged for a frauditor as outlined above (Tickner, 
2010).  ‘Ultimately, for a public sector body, dealing with discovered fraud and corruption has to be about protecting 
the public purse…’  (Tickner, 2015, p84). It is  not unsurprising that there has been an over emphasis on the criminal 
justice system in public sector counter-fraud work when around a fifth of counter fraud specialists were recruited 
from the police or the armed forces (Button et al, 2007b, p201)  
In a police-oriented fraud investigator’s role the task is driven by the need to identify the elements that would 
enable a criminal charge of fraud to be considered a viable option by a prosecuting authority.  The frauditor is not so 
constrained or driven by the methodology and process, rather by the concepts behind the role of a frauditor and 
forensic internal auditing.  One consequence of an over-emphasis on the police approach to solving crimes is a 
tendency to become unnecessarily concerned about the motives and rationalisation of a suspected fraudster or 
seeking to establish whether an individual in a position of trust may fit the elements associated with what has 
become misleadingly known as Cressey’s Fraud Triangle (following an interpretation by  the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners Joseph T Wells and others of the conclusions drawn in Cressey’s 1953 study of the social psychology 
of embezzlement for his doctoral thesis - which in itself  developed from the original research into ‘white collar’ 
crime by Cressey’s tutor and mentor (Sutherland, 1949)).  For most fraud related offences (except false accounting) 
it is necessary in a criminal case to show beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had the means, opportunity and 
a dishonest intent.  The need to prove dishonest intent can cause investigators to spend a significant amount of time 
in trying to establish the motives of the accused fraudster.  It is the candidate’s contention that this is an 
unnecessary investigative effort and cost for the organisation that has been the victim of the fraud.  ‘Obtaining a 
criminal conviction should be seen as the icing on the cake, not the intended end in mind of the investigation.’ 
(Tickner, 2010, p239). The principles for a frauditor are centred round using the minimal effort necessary to stop a 
fraud and prevent further losses and if possible identify the culprit in order to recover any lost funds where possible.  
(Tickner, 2010 p7, p9, p51, p53, 2012 p6, p10)). These aims may not be coterminous with the approach to a criminal 
investigation for a prosecuting authority – one of the key points of difference with the approach to fraud 
investigation proposed by the candidate.  
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Figure 5 
Types of Audit Activity 
Type Internal or 
External  
Differentiating Characteristics 
Vouching and 
Verification 
Both Internal 
and External 
Comprehensive checking of financial documents for accuracy and 
veracity.  Historical approach largely abandoned in 20th century. 
Participative Internal Audit Ongoing in ‘real time’.  Non-confrontational, working in 
collaboration with auditees, any formal recommendations jointly 
made with auditee.   
Systems/Risk-Based Mainly Internal  Tests at a point in time.  Identifies key risks, tests for effectiveness 
of controls to mitigate risk. Recommends systems improvements 
Financial Accounts and 
Controls 
Mainly External After the event testing of how financial controls have operated.  
Materiality concept – ignores fraud/error that isn’t material to the 
published financial data and accounts 
Forensic Accounting External Audit Post discovery legally based examination of financial records when 
fraud alleged or discovered - or major mismanagement exposed. 
Forensic Auditing 
(the Frauditor Concept) 
Internal Audit Pre-discovery capacity to prevent and detect fraud and 
mismanagement proactively, post discovery capability to manage 
the fraud investigation prior to any police/external investigation. 
Holistic approach to dealing with fraud and error. 
 
Primary objective of the frauditor 
For a frauditor the candidate has envisioned the primary objective is to provide a holistic approach for a large 
organisation, such as those in the public sector, to manage both a strategy to minimise the risk of fraud and error 
and to have a proactive detection and investigation of fraud, regardless of whether there is any involvement of the 
criminal justice system or the police in determining the outcome of any fraud investigation.   
A key secondary objective is to establish the facts of the alleged fraud as near to the source as possible, adopting the 
principles of a sharp, focused investigation based on ‘following the money’ and ‘beginning with the end in mind’. 
(Tickner, 2010 pp 8-9, p18, p51).   How to be a Successful Frauditor (Tickner, 2010) is structured around linking the 
theoretical concepts of the role of a frauditor with the actions necessary for a practitioner to achieve their objective 
in the field by following the principles set out and the practical advice linked to those principles.  A central tenet is 
the practical application of scientific rigour to fraud investigation without becoming distracted by potentially false 
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hypotheses based on assumptions made without any objective evidence to support them.  The principle is to 
concentrate on establishing the likelihood that a fraud has been committed and the nature of the fraud.  By 
following the money wherever possible and rigorously identifying facts as well as evaluating available intelligence 
and evidence the identity of the fraudster is likely to be revealed.  The primary objective for a frauditor once an 
allegation of fraud has been made is to identify if there is an on-going fraud and stop it as soon as possible while 
taking whatever steps are possible to recover any lost funds. These are not the primary objectives of a criminal fraud 
investigation, which is concerned about concepts of legal proof and the possibility of criminal conviction followed by 
any restitution, which in itself may be some distance away in time from when the fraud has been committed.  The 
methodology and principles proposed by the candidate, can still be usable in any subsequent police investigation 
(Tickner, 2010, p80, p93, p107).  It is one of the candidate’s fundamental tenets that it is necessary in almost all 
cases to commence the internal fraud investigation before any potential police involvement. This has implications 
for the application of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (‘PACE’) and the start of any civil recovery actions that are 
ultimately beneficial to the public sector organisation seeking to stop a fraud and recover lost assets. (Tickner, 2010, 
pp91-93, pp166-167). 
 
Core Principles of Fraud Investigation for the Frauditor  
The core principles set out in ‘How to be a Successful Frauditor’ (Tickner, 2010) are : 
 Believing nothing but only seeking to question that which is worth questioning (p19) 
 Tracing the original source of the fraud allegation to establish the actual allegation (p48) 
 Prioritising stopping any ongoing fraud (p9, p51, p53) 
 Beginning the investigation with the end in mind (p51, p70) 
 Wherever possible following the money, as ultimately it will lead to the fraudster (p18)  
 Understanding that there are always three systems, the prescribed, the alleged and the actual. Until the 
actual is discovered the frauditor won’t have the full picture (p18) 
 Conducting a fact-finding investigation to establish all the relevant facts, whether or not they support the 
allegation (p81, p93) 
 Securing any evidence to the standard that may be needed for a criminal case (p107) 
 Not reporting the fraud to the police unless absolutely necessary and there is sufficient criminal evidence 
(p46, p281) 
 Interviewing witnesses before suspects to gather evidence and intelligence to establish the relevant facts 
(p150) 
 Keeping all contemporaneous notes and records of fact-finding interviews and evidence (p81) 
 Keeping adequate records of decisions made and why made during the investigation (p73, p86) 
 Avoiding interviewing suspects until the answers to key questions to be asked are already known (p168) 
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 Using experts (e.g. lawyers, forensic accountants) to support, not run, investigations (p69) 
 Seeking to recover any fraudulently stolen assets through civil routes regardless of any criminal case (p288) 
 Ensuring progress and investigation reports are clear and unambiguous for those receiving them (pp81-2, 
p87) 
 Identifying any system weaknesses or control failures that allowed the fraud to happen (p40, p83) 
The concept of auditing as both a rational approach and a separate professional discipline has been well established 
since Mautz and Sharaf’s seminal 1961 work (Grodz, 2012, pp85-102).  Within public sector auditing that 
‘professional’ approach can be extended then focused  and rationalised in the context of fraud auditing – i.e. the 
‘frauditor’, a logical development of the original government auditor concept (Tickner, 2015, pp270-271).  The fraud 
investigation principles outlined by the candidate in ‘How to Be a Successful Frauditor’ have parallels with George 
Polya’s teaching and methods in the context of encouraging mathematics researchers and teachers (Polya, 1957).  
The candidate’s personal philosophy from his earliest work experience onward has always been centred round the 
principle of believing nothing, questioning only what is worth questioning and seeking to prove the truth (Parker, 
1976, p1).  This is echoed in principles set out by the candidate for fraud investigation ‘Short and sharp works, long 
and complex doesn’t’ and ‘If the area concerned is complicated to prove, look around for an easier option’ (Tickner, 
2010, p18, p70), as well as the principle of establishing the actual rather than the prescribed or alleged before 
drawing any conclusions about fraud data (Tickner, 2010, p8)). This demonstrates a  scientific basis to the conceptual 
approach of  the candidate, based largely around ethnography and a heuristic approach to learning about fraud 
investigation over  40 years practical experience, as developed in more depth later.   
 
The Frauditor’s methodology 
The frauditor methodology can be seen within the context of criminology and white collar crime. The candidate’s 
frauditor methodology is not a rigid system or process that limits the imagination and conceptualisation of the 
investigator - instead it is built round a series of grounded principles  coupled with the need to achieve the primary 
objective of any fraud investigation in preventing further losses, identifying the culprit(s) and recovering as much as 
possible of any lost assets.  The candidate describes this approach as ‘pragmatic realism’.  An example of pragmatic 
realism is in the recommendations for dealing with different types and levels of internal fraudsters (Tickner 2010 
pp51-57).  
The methods proposed for the frauditor have roots in both quantitative and qualitative research.  In the field of 
criminology it is the ‘norm’ for research methods with roots in both positivism and non-positivism (Jupp, 1989, 
p128).   
Under the methodology proposed by the candidate the fraud investigator in the public sector is using an analytical 
approach to identify relevant facts from documents, records, structured intelligence and structured interviews of 
witnesses and those who can explain the records and documents identified in the fraud investigation.   To that end 
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the frauditor has a number of tools available, from the candidate’s simplified model for evaluating intelligence and 
evidence that is more proactive than the standard police model as it forces the evaluator to make a positive decision 
about quality and reliability of intelligence or evidence (Tickner, 2010, p90) through to use of statistical techniques 
that can be used to assist the frauditor such as Benford’s Law and Stop or Go sampling (Tickner, 2010, pp27-28, 
pp177-178, pp381-386).    
 
Isomorphic Learning from Cases of Fraud 
Isomorphic learning is one of the key theoretical processes adopted by organisations to manage risk (Borodzicz, 
2005, p14).   Isomorphic learning occurs when groups in organisations learn from other organisations’ disasters, risk 
assess their own organisation and adapt systems and process to try to prevent the same disaster striking their 
organisation (Button, 2008, p42).   Internal and contractor frauds generally occur due to the failure, non-existence or 
non-operation of key preventative and detective controls within an organisation.  It is possible to apply isomorphic 
learning from a fraud in one organisation to similar organisations.  The candidate recognised this in the approach 
taken in all his published books to date, specifically concentrating on the approach in ‘The Successful Frauditor’s 
Casebook’ (Tickner, 2012) although relevant case studies to enable isomorphic learning also occur in ‘How to be a 
Successful Frauditor’ (Tickner, 2010, pp22-25, 29-31, 32-40, 190-202, 205-207) and in ‘Fraud and Corruption in Public 
Services’ (Tickner, 2015, pp85-87, 89, 91-92, 145-149, 155-163, 171-204, 212-217).   
The candidate takes isomorphic learning a stage further by noting that ‘fraud auditors and investigators don’t get 
delivered by the stork fully formed and professionally at the top of their game. We all learn our trade by a mixture of 
other colleague’s experiences, learning what can or cannot be done and, ultimately we learn from our own earlier 
mistakes.’ (Tickner, 2012, p15).   The candidate’s own learning journey is used as part of the isomorphic learning 
process and independently echoes in the NHS and the wider public sector the analysis of types of fraudulent and 
corrupt activities found in Mars in classifying cheats at work (Mars, 1982, p2), (Tickner, 2012, p23).  The Successful 
Frauditor’s Casebook (Tickner, 2012) is structured in a way that encourages the reader to acquire isomorphic 
learning for their situation and organisation (e.g. Tickner, 2012, pp171-190, pp213-214). 
Common organisational failures the candidate has identified as allowing significant frauds to occur include key 
preventative controls such as:  failure to conduct any financial vetting of those appointed to positions of trust, failure 
to oversee or supervise the work of the fraudster, ignorance of the need for certain controls to be in place to 
prevent fraud, a lack of segregation of duties allowing the fraudster unsupervised access to assets and records of 
those assets, absence or circumvention of a key control necessary to prevent the fraud.  Inadequate detection 
controls in place to enable a fraud to be discovered at an early stage include: the failure to have independent 
reconciliation of financial records and assets, ineffective monitoring of budgets, non-existent management checks 
and the failure to use available techniques and technology to identify unusual spending patterns.  Illustrative 
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examples include ‘the Laird of Tomintoul’ (Tickner, 2012, pp93-105) and ‘Charity begins at home’ (Tickner, 2012, pp 
51-63). 
 
 Fraud Risk Management and Fraud Prevention – Development of Practical Fraud Risk Management Tools by the 
Candidate 
The measurement of the likelihood of fraud occurring and methodologies to prevent organisational fraud is one 
aspect of organisational risk management that has been the subject of more concern in the private sector due to the 
number of major business failures during and since the global financial collapse of 2007-8.  When considering fraud 
risk: ’External auditors focus on the misstatement of the financial statements, whereas internal auditors tend to 
focus on detecting, preventing and monitoring fraud risks’ (Vona, 2011, p26). There has been much debate about 
external auditors of company accounts and their possible lack of fraud experience to carry out adequate fraud risk 
assessments before determining levels of testing (e.g. Mock et al, 2017).  One problem in the private sector has been 
that fraud risk assessments that follow best practice of considering both likelihood and impact of a fraud have the 
unintended negative result of lessening the auditor’s expectation that a fraud may occur and actually reducing levels 
of audit testing (Simon et al, 2018, p275).   
Fraud risk and the prevention of fraud in the UK public sector has only been subject to specific research in the NHS 
and benefit fraud. Since the demise of the Audit Commission and the abolition of the National Fraud Authority there 
has been less transparency around fraud data for the public sector despite increased transparency regulation for 
local government bodies in England and Wales (Tickner, 2015, pp276-277).   One key aspect of fraud prevention is 
organisational culture coupled with awareness of risks and possibilities.  This was recognised by the Audit 
Commission with their ‘Changing Organisational Culture’ toolkit that they provided as an added chargeable service 
to their public sector clients.  In the candidate’s own experience the tone at the top has a strong impact on fraud 
awareness and the likelihood of internal fraud (Tickner, 2015, pp150-151).  
An alternative strategy to aid fraud prevention as envisaged by the candidate encompasses building on an 
appropriate organisational culture and tone from the top with a practical fraud risk assessment linked to both the 
internal audit risk assessment and the overall organisational risk assessment with proactive detailed random 
checking of financial transactions at all levels within organisations (Tickner, 2015, pp269-272).  To that end the 
candidate developed practical tools during his time at HM Treasury and the Metropolitan Police, based around 
learning acquired both during a five-year spell lecturing in systems auditing and from experiences gained from 
dealing with public sector frauds .  A key initial tool was the development by the candidate of an audit needs 
assessment (risk assessment) based on a simple mathematical model around the risk and likelihood of the failure of 
internal controls within the business and operational systems of first HM Treasury and then the Metropolitan Police.  
The model was designed by the candidate to measure qualitative elements on a five-point Likert scale and 
quantitative elements in five proportional steps where 1= lowest risk and 5 = highest risk. While the primary use of 
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this model was to determine the need for internal audit activity and resource requirements for an effective internal 
audit, it was also an assessment of the likelihood of significant risks such as system failure, fraud and 
mismanagement.   
After a decade of gathering data through the work of the Forensic Internal Audit team set up by the candidate in the 
MPS in 1996, the candidate was in a position to develop a needs assessment and risk analysis that concentrated 
exclusively on the risk and likelihood of fraud affecting the business of the Metropolitan Police.11  Out of this fraud 
risk model the need to find a way to present a clear and effective message to management led to the candidate’s 
development of a ‘fraud risk wheel’ that proved to be an extremely effective method of gaining top management 
attention and pictorially representing the biggest fraud risks to the organisation that needed mitigating or 
preventing (Tickner ,2010, pp304-308) 2015, pp151-153).  Very quickly police and management nicknamed the fraud 
risk model ‘the wheel of misfortune.’  The concept of the Fraud Risk Wheel has since been adopted by others in the 
counter fraud world including the London Fraud Forum and the leading professional body for UK local authorities on 
financial matters (CIPFA).  A revised fraud risk wheel for use in local authorities and housing associations has been 
produced and marketed by TIIA and CIPFA on their websites as a fraud risk tool since 2011. Cifas12 currently (2019) 
recommends the fraud risk wheel to public sector clients. 
 
Conclusion  
Through the publication of books the candidate has sought to educate and influence practitioners and academics 
dealing with fraud. The candidate’s books have contributed to the development of white collar crime theory through 
the development of the frauditor concept and techniques and methodologies to enhance the detection and 
investigation of fraud.  The candidate has also created a new fraud risk model that has been developed and used 
within the public sector counter-fraud and auditing world.   How to be a Successful Frauditor (Tickner, 2010) is partly 
a blueprint for the frauditor concept and partly a model for fraud investigators within the public sector, as within the 
book are self-tests and exercises to confirm the reader’s grasp and understanding as well as case studies and 
exemplars to explain concepts.   The candidate’s second book, the Successful Frauditor’s Casebook (Tickner, 2012), 
emphasises the role of isomorphic learning for organisations and investigators to improve fraud prevention and 
detection.  In addition to case studies from the candidate’s own experience the candidate has researched cases from 
around the world where lessons can be learnt.  The candidate has demonstrated an original approach in developing 
and refining forensic internal auditing and the concept of the frauditor in the public sector, a fraud risk methodology 
and the fraud risk wheel. .     
Ultimately the candidate’s body of work is a coherent paradigm for the prevention and detection of internal and 
contractor fraud in the public sector that can create significant benefit to the organisation and the taxpayer. The 
                                                          
11
 The candidate’s methodology is outlined in the 2012 national ‘Fighting Fraud Locally’ strategy produced by CIPFA on behalf of 
all local authorities as an example of best practice from the Metropolitan Police Authority.   
12
Cifas = Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System. It is a not-for-profit organisation advising on fraud prevention 
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candidate’s work is leading the way in pointing up the key skills necessary for counter-fraud work and how existing 
internal resources (i.e. internal audit) can be skilled and tasked to take a far more proactive role in dealing with fraud 
affecting the public sector.    
 
The way forward and further research 
The candidate has identified the potential to research and develop a training programme based around the frauditor 
concept and to research how the frauditor can be developed in parallel with or replace key aspects of the 
development of a counter fraud profession within the UK government.  The frauditor concept and fraud risk 
methodology can be researched in the context of its beneficial value to the wider public sector and private sector.   
The candidate’s work can be linked to developing an effective means of dealing with white collar crime in the 
context of the current failure of the criminal justice system to tackle white collar crime effectively.  
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Glossary of Terms 
Audit Commission 
Abolished in March 2015, this arm’s length public body created from April 1983was responsible for the external 
audit of local authorities and (from 1990) NHS bodies until its abolition.  
Audit Needs Assessment 
A process for determining the level and amount of internal audit coverage needed by an organisation in a given time 
period. 
Corruption 
Collusive acts between individuals for the dishonest purpose of financial gain for themselves and/or others at the 
expense or loss of a third party, including any offence defined in the Bribery Act 2010. 
Cressey’s Fraud Triangle 
An explanation of the rationalisation and motivation for a person in a position of trust in an organisation to commit 
fraud, developed by Joseph Wells during the 1970s, based on the theories of Donald Cressey (Other People’s Money, 
1953) and from Cressey’s research into the reasons why men featured in his study of 106 convicted embezzlers had 
committed such crimes. Cressey identified three common characteristics of the embezzlers featured in the study – 
they had a non-shareable financial problem, they were able to abuse their position of trust to embezzle funds and 
they were able to rationalise their actions before and after embezzlement. 
External Audit 
The professionally qualified13 individuals external to an entity appointed to conduct the statutory audits of the 
accounts and business activities of an entity in the public and private sectors.   
Effectiveness 
Originally a concept associated with Value for Money (VFM seen as three E’s.  Economy – doing things cheap, 
Efficiency – doing things well, Effectiveness – doing the right things), in an audit context this means testing that the 
right controls are working as intended to enable an organisation to achieve its objectives. 
Detective or Detection Controls [see Internal Control] 
Controls put in place to detect fraud or error in a business system during or after the event of a fraud or error. 
                                                          
13
 External audits in the UK may only be conducted under the control of a fully qualified chartered (FCA etc) or certified (ACA etc) 
accountant.  No other type of accountant can be used in the UK private sector, although in the public sector a CIPFA (Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy) qualified accountant may conduct an external audit of a relevant public sector 
body.  
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Fraud 
A deviant act committed by an individual with the dishonest intention of causing a financial gain for themselves or 
others and a financial loss to a third party either through false representation, failure to disclose information or 
abuse of position.  
Frauditor 
A specialist internal auditor who looks proactively for fraud and corruption to investigate within an organisation. 
Fraud Risk Wheel 
A pie chart designed to emphasise the relative significance of specific fraud risks affecting an organisation. 
Holistic risk-based Auditing 
A process by which internal auditors identify the key risks across all areas of an organisation and its operations, both 
financial and otherwise, before drawing up a programme of work to test the effectiveness of the organisation’s 
arrangements to mitigate or prevent significant risks to the organisation occurring. 
Key control [see also Internal Control] 
A significant control mechanism put in place to enable a system to achieve its objectives. It is a control that if it is not 
operating effectively or is absent, the system will fail to achieve its objectives or have significant risk of fraud, error 
or waste. 
Internal Audit 
An objective, independent review of an organisation and its systems of internal controls by individuals based within 
the organisation as a service to the organisation and those responsible for its corporate governance. 
Internal Control(s) 
The mechanism(s) put in place by management in an organisation to ensure that a business system achieves an 
intended purpose. For example, ensuring that an activity is authorised by a manager before it can take place or 
routine checking that an activity has taken place by someone independent of the person responsible for carrying out 
that activity.  There is an argument in the external audit world that internal audit is part of a business’s system of 
internal control that reviews the adequacy and effectiveness of other internal controls.  
Internal Financial Control(s) 
Controls within a financial system to ensure that the intended outcomes of the system take place.  For example, 
segregating duties between those responsible for raising invoices and those receiving payment to avoid the risk of 
income due being suppressed and cash or payments stolen by the person responsible for receiving the payment.  
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Materiality 
An external audit concept whereby accounts and other financial records are given a clean bill of health unless fraud 
or error is substantial enough to make a difference to published financial information such that a reader of the 
information would be drawn to a mistaken conclusion as to their substance and meaning. 
National Audit Office 
Succeeded the Exchequer and Audit Department of Her Majesty’s Treasury in 1966.  It is the body responsible for the 
statutory and value-for-money audits of all central government departments, UK government agencies and Non-
Departmental Government Bodies. 
Preventative Controls [see Internal Control] 
Controls put in place to try to prevent fraud or error taking place in a business system. 
 Significant Risks 
Risks that could cause a major business or system failure, or stop an organisation from functioning in a key business 
area. 
Systems Auditing 
The process of auditing an entity by reviewing and testing its business and financial systems to evaluate the strength 
of internal controls meant to help achieve the business objectives of the system being reviewed. The process 
involves mapping the key controls in a system and then testing for compliance.  Failures in compliance may lead to 
more extensive testing to evaluate the likely loss due to the failures identified.  
Truth and Fairness 
External auditors will form a professional opinion as to whether the financial records, statutory accounts and related 
official statements by an organisation within a given time period are true (i.e. accurately reflect the underlying 
financial transactions) and fair (i.e. do not present a misleading view of the financial position of the organisation in 
respect of its financial transactions) 
White Collar Crime 
Originally defined by Sutherland in 1949 as crimes and sharp practices such as theft, fraud, embezzlement, 
overcharging and misrepresentation to the public committed by those in a position of trust in the upper or top 
echelons of a company, it has become the generic term in criminology and social science for any such activity by 
anyone in a position of trust in an organisation. 
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Vouching and Verification Auditing 
An audit of the financial transactions of an entity, conducted by taking each voucher (e.g. an invoice or a receipt for 
goods or services) and verifying the accuracy of the financial information displayed on the voucher.   
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Annex 1 
List of Submissions written by Peter Tickner 
(2002). Dodging the Dodgy Contractor,  Auditorium no 39, Winter 2002, HM Treasury 
(2007) Forensic Auditing in the United Kingdom Metropolitan Police Authority, Case 6.5 in Cutting Edge Internal 
Auditing, Ridley (Editor) (2008) Chichester, J Wiley and Sons  
(2010). Dealing with the Law, Fraud Intelligence, August/September 2010, Informa.  
(2010). How to Be a Successful Frauditor, Chichester, J Wiley and Sons 
(2011). White Coat Wiles, Fraud Intelligence, October/November 2011, Informa 
(2012). The Successful Frauditor’s Casebook, Chichester, J Wiley and Sons 
 (2012). Watch Your Back, Fraud Intelligence, April/May 2012, Informa. 
(2014). Pitfalls and perils: whistleblowing in the UK public sector,  Fraud Intelligence, June/July 2014. Informa.  
(2015). Fraud and Corruption in Public Services, Farnham, Gower (Routledge) 
 (2019) Developing the role of the Frauditor: a forensic internal audit cost effective alternative to the policing of 
internal and contractor fraud in the public sector.  Accepted for publication by Policing: A Journal of Policy and 
Practice. 
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Annex 2  
Relevant reviews, testimonials and citations on published material by the candidate 
Selection of citations of ‘How to be a Successful Frauditor’  
1.1 Google Scholar sample citations
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1.2 Button M., & Gee, J. (2013). Countering fraud for competitive advantage, Chichester: Wiley. 
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1.3 Dr M Gilbert – Thesis - citation 
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2. Selection of citations of ‘Fraud and Corruption in Public Services’ 
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3. Reviews and testimonials 
From Mark Rowe, editor, Professional Security magazine 
mark@professionalsecurity.co.uk 
Monday, May 20, 2019. 
Re: Peter Tickner 
Peter approached me to ask for comment, as he is seeking a PhD by publication through the University of 
Portsmouth. I can best begin to answer, as the editor since 1999 of Professional Security, a magazine for UK private 
security managers, in terms of others I know in the field. 
Several UK academics have devoted their working lives to the study of fraud prevention, such as Professor Mike Levi. 
Good work is done by Jim Gee with Prof Mark Button of Portsmouth. 
Among fraud practitioners, Mike Comer stands out for his books in terms of content (notably ‘Corporate Fraud’) and 
sheer bravura style of writing. I note that Mike describes Peter as ‘legendary’, which is just the word I would use (and 
have used) of Mike.  
What Peter Tickner has achieved in his three books, that neither the academics nor the practitioners in the field have 
achieved, with the possible exception of Mike Comer, is to marry the best of both; the rigour of unflinching and 
accurate description of reality, however unpleasant and disappointing for human nature, something evidently part of 
the work of fraud-audit.      
As the holder of a first-class degree in history (Bristol, 1989) and a further, MSc degree in sports history and culture 
(De Montfort, 2018) I would provocatively argue that the PhD is not good enough for Peter, given that (in my 
opinion) an ordinary doctorate so much based on the review of the literature – in other words, quoting the same dry 
old sources – is not equal to what Peter (and Mike Comer) have achieved in their published work.  
Peter’s three books go beyond personal memoir and are of use not only for the study of fraud in particular and 
criminology in general, but policing, business organisation, and psychology. The three books amount to at least a 
PhD’s worth of insight into the nature of fraud and its prevention, a subject at the same time under-studied and yet 
so large, so multi-billion, that it does the UK economic harm, besides the suffering done to victims.    
My reviews of Peter’s books: 
https://www.professionalsecurity.co.uk/reviews/how-to-be-a-successful-frauditor/ 
https://www.professionalsecurity.co.uk/reviews/fraud-and-corruption-in-public-services/ 
https://www.professionalsecurity.co.uk/reviews/the-successful-frauditors-casebook/ 
I can gladly write at further length, for example about how each book meets the PhD standard for original thinking.  
Yours truly, Mark Rowe 
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4/6/2019 
Peter Tickner was there first. All the current talk of auditors’ responsibilities around fraud detection seems, well, so 
old hat having read Peter’s books – notably ‘How to be a Successful Frauditor’ – and articles across the years. Not 
constitutionally fitted to be a mere watchdog, he is the original bloodhound who brings not just technical mastery of 
auditing but also rigorous investigative technique, and a forensic questioning of motives and agendas, especially in 
politicised organisational settings, to bear on case material and critical analysis that is instructive to both 
practitioners and to students and researchers of the field. As an editor of titles in the financial crime space (Fraud 
Intelligence [www.counter-fraud.com] and Money Laundering Bulletin [www.moneylaunderingbulletin.com]), I know 
our readers, all either professionals or academics, have learnt much from his writing, as I undoubtedly have. 
Timon Molloy     
Managing Editor 
 T: +44 (0) 7767 008977 
timon.molloy@informa.com 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The work that Peter Tickner did creating the ‘wheel of fraud’ was really quite ground breaking, a visual that really did 
help others in the industry consider how they might tackle fraud risk. I have used the example of many occasion and 
spoken of it often. In my opinion is it has stood the test of time - indeed I am using it at the Public Sector Fraud 
Forum this week. [24 June 2019] 
As part of my role as Head of Public Sector Fraud at the Home Office when I drafted the Fighting Fraud Locally 
Strategy and its Review I did reference the wheel for use in Local Authorities and many used it as background. The 
University of Portsmouth have now referenced this strategy in the UoP Criminal Justice Undergrad reading papers as 
good practice, I would also add that I have been using it (the strategy )in talks to the OECD. 
Rachael Tiffen 
Director, Local Government 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Classification: SUITABLE FOR PUBLICATION       26/9/2019 
Peter 
It was good to catch up last week. 
Following on from our conversation I am happy to confirm that the City of London Police, Economic Crime Academy 
has over the years used your books a reference material when preparing material and has made reference to it 
during training courses. The books have provided useful real world examples and case studies. 
Regards 
Chris 
T/DCI Chris Felton 
Director Economic Crime Academy 
City of London Police 
Email chris.felton@cityoflondon.police.uk 
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